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Abstract  
This paper presents a comprehensive conceptual framework for the rationale, 
success factors and development outcomes of Special Economic Zones (SEZs), 
and analyses their performance in selected Asian countries within that 
framework. It draws on the tenets of the literature on ‘dynamics of institutional 
changes’ to introduce basic assumptions and generates a series of propositions 
as building blocks of the framework. It argues that SEZs are a safety valve that 
can address inefficiencies within a given institutional context. If used 
strategically, the SEZ policy can be an exceedingly versatile tool to achieve a 
variety of goals. The drivers of success and economic outcomes of SEZs 
depend on the strategic approach adopted by policy makers towards SEZs. 
There is no single recipe of their success or development outcomes. Finally, 
institutions evolve in the process of development. So must strategic approaches 
towards SEZs. New genres of SEZs need to emerge and the existing ones must 
upgrade to address new institutional challenges, and achieve new goals. It 
argues that is the SEZ policy and not SEZs per se that need to be the focal point 
of the SEZ debate.  
 
Keywords; Special economic zones, Dynamic institutional Framework, Asian 
countries, Development outcomes, Success factors 
1 I am indebted to Ari Kokko, Michael Jacobsen and Thomas Farole for their useful comments on earlier 
drafts of the paper at different points of time. Usual disclaimer applies. 
1 
Asia Research Centre, CBS, Copenhagen Discussion Papers [2017-64] 
 
                                                   
1. Introduction 
Special economic zones (SEZs) first emerged in the 12th century Europe in the 
form of free ports, free cities and free zones, and flourished in the Middle Ages 
when mercantilism ruled the Continent. The objective was to foster re-export or 
entrepôt trade by overcoming high tariff barriers pervasive in the then 
mercantilist era without opening the domestic market to foreign goods. 
Mercantilism declined in the mid 18th century but SEZs persisted. Not only did 
they persist but also evolved into new forms. They remained concentrated in the 
developed world until the mid 20th Century when several developing countries 
which became independent from their colonial rulers and adopted 
import-substituting policies as the cornerstone of their development strategies 
found them useful in promoting trade by overcoming high tariff barriers. The first 
wave of SEZs, which took place between the mid-1960s and 1980s witnessed a 
surge in their number across the developing world . In the late 1980s and early 
1990s when most countries abandoned protected regimes and embraced trade 
reforms, SEZs were expected to lose their relevance. Contrary to the 
expectations however, their number continued to surge. Different types of SEZs 
characterized by different designs and objectives have emerged in different 
types of macroeconomic settings, and have become instrumental in attracting 
economic activities linked with the multinational enterprise (MNE) coordinated 
global value chains (GVCs) (Aggarwal 2012a; Basile and Germidis, 1984; 
Baissac, 2011; FIAS, 2008; Haywood, 2004; Meng, 2005; Omar and Stoever, 
2008). Despite their long history, continuity and adaptive dynamism, however, 
their relevance and development outcomes remain a highly contentious issue 
(Aggarwal, 2012a; Bassiac, 2011; Engman et al, 2007; Farole, 2011; FIAS, 
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2008; Gibbon et al; Kusago and Tzannots, 1998; Madani, 1999; 2008; Milberg 
and Amengual, 2008). They have been instrumental in driving employment, FDI 
and exports in a number of countries but their success in promoting economic 
development remains limited to a few countries posing a critical question: Why 
are success stories few despite there being almost consensus among policy 
makers on their usefulness as a tool for sustained growth? The present study 
argues that this could essentially be attributed to a lack of clear understanding of 
the conditions and justification for setting up SEZs, and the factors driving their 
success. The existing dominant literature provides limited guidance on the 
mechanisms through which SEZs can drive growth and development. The surge 
in the number of SEZs has essentially been prompted by the success of a few 
countries. Most countries have set up/ expanded their SEZs in the expectation of 
emulating their success, ignoring the framework conditions that allow SEZs to 
become successful (Pfister, 2017). For a better understanding of the potential of 
SEZs as a development tool, therefore, there is a need to move to a cohesive, 
coherent and integrated framework, which can explain the rationale, critical 
success factors and development outcomes of SEZs. The present study is a step 
in this direction. The theoretical paradigm developed in this paper is termed ‘A 
new dynamic institutional (NDI) framework for SEZs’. The paper explains the 
basic tenets of this framework and analyses the SEZ experience of three 
countries namely Taiwan, South Korea, and China within this framework. 
 
There is no single universally accepted definition of SEZs. Nor is there a 
universally accepted terminology for them (Farole, 2011; FIAS, 2008). The paper 
focuses on well-defined geographically delineated economic spaces where 
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economic activities are primarily export oriented and are carried out under 
special regulatory and institutional frameworks that are different from the rest of 
the economy. The main argument is threefold. First, SEZs are a ‘safety valve’, 
which allows the government to address institutional impediments to growth 
without giving a shock to the institutional set up in the wider economy. This 
makes them a highly potent policy tool. Second, there is no generic list of 
success factors and outcomes of SEZs. There are multiple strategic approaches 
towards SEZs. The drivers of success and economic outcomes of SEZs depend 
on the strategic approach adopted by policy makers in the SEZ implementation, 
and its effectiveness. Finally, institutions evolve in the process of growth; so 
must strategic approaches towards SEZs. New genres of SEZs need to emerge 
and the existing ones must upgrade to address new institutional challenges. 
 
Section 2 reviews the existing theoretical literature on SEZs. Section 3 focuses 
on developing a conceptual framework, which is used to analyse the experience 
of three most successful countries namely China, South Korea and Taiwan in 
Section 4. Finally, Section 5 concludes the analysis.  
 
2. Existing theoretical approaches to SEZs: A brief review    
There are three dominant approaches to explain the rationale, success factors 
and development outcomes of SEZs: the orthodox (neo-classical), the neo 
Marxist, and the heterodox. While the former two emerged in the early stages of 
SEZ evolution, the last approach came about in the mid 1980s.  
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The neo-classical approach  
The neo-classical school adopts a trade centered approach and views SEZs as 
enclaves offering open and freer trade policies to promote GVC-linked foreign 
capital and trade in import substituting regimes by overcoming anti-export bias 
inherent in the regime. It means that ensuring a free trade regime within SEZs is 
critical for their success. In addition, the attractiveness of SEZs is directly linked 
with their cost competitiveness. Other critical success factors therefore include: 
abundant labor supply, relaxations in labor standards, cheap factory sites and 
utilities, strategic location near the sea/airports, and an investor friendly custom 
regime. The underlying assumption is that MNEs relocate essentially 
labor-intensive segments of their production processes in these countries where 
the latter enjoy comparative advantages.  
 
The majority of studies associated with this school use the formal international 
trade modeling approach to assess the development outcomes of SEZs and find 
them to be either directly welfare-reducing or resulting in the creation of a dual 
economic structure that harms long-term efficiency in the allocation of resources. 
They may generate trade and trade related benefits in particular foreign 
exchange and employment but these benefits come at a huge cost to the 
economy and state exchequer. Hamada (1974) dismisses FDI-induced benefits 
by showing that the technology accompanied with FDI in the zones has little 
relevance for the host country and can distort its production structure. 
 
Warr (1989) in his seminal work used a ‘cost-benefit’ approach to assess the net 
benefits generated by SEZs. He observes that by using domestic capital, 
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workers, and public utilities, SEZs can have an induced-consumption (multiplier) 
effect on the economy (Baissac, 2003; Jayanthakumaran, 2003). But, the effect 
is not substantial when compared with the cost that is incurred in setting them 
up. Backward linkages through local sourcing are also found to be negligible 
because the local firms are generally not in a position to meet the cost, quality 
and commitment standards required by the SEZ firms (Warr, 1989,1990; 
Madani, 1999).  
 
A group of political economists emerged in the 1960s within the neo-classical 
school (Buchanan and Tullock, 1962; Arrow, 1963; Krueger, 1974) argue that 
there is no rationale for SEZs except that they are a rent seeking instrument set 
up by bureaucrats to show favors to the business community. They view SEZs as 
‘tax shelters’, which induce relocation or diversion of economic activity from 
domestic areas to SEZs causing huge cost to the state exchequer with no net 
addition to investment and economic activity.  
 
Following the success of Chinese SEZs, it was proposed that SEZs might be set 
up as ‘testing labs’ for facilitating the process of economic transition and 
liberalization (World Bank, 1992: 18). But, there is ambiguity in SEZs’ role in the 
transition from an inward- to an outward oriented development strategy. The 
possibility that they permit the continuation of highly protective trade and 
investment regimes can not be ruled out (Schrank, 2001; World Bank, 1992).  
 
The conclusion is that neo classical theoretical approaches to SEZs are rather 
pessimistic.  This school views the problem of underdevelopment as being a 
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problem of inefficient resource allocation at the national level. Protectionist trade 
policies affect different sectors asymmetrically and worsen the allocation of 
resources. Introduction of SEZs in this regime can distort an already distorted 
economy and significantly reduce national welfare. 
 
The neo Marxists approach 
It avers that the primary rationale of setting up SEZs is to offer cheap labor with 
low labor standards rather than tax, tariff or any other privileges. SEZs are thus 
designed with an overarching focus on labor institutions. The development 
outcomes include: labor exploitation within the zones, declining employment 
opportunities outside them due to diversion of resources from the mainland, and 
dependency on foreign capital. For the Neo Marxists, SEZs are world factories 
with dramatically lower wages, performing assembly line work, which is the least 
sophisticated segment of the production process (Fröbel et al., 1978; Frank, 
1967). SEZ companies are typically more integrated with the foreign countries 
than the rest of the domestic economy and generate few backward and forward 
linkages. This perpetuates dependency ties of the host countries with the 
developed ones.  
 
Heterodox approach 
Until the mid 1980s, SEZs were almost entirely explained by the trade centerd 
approaches which regarded SEZs relevant because they offered free trade 
conditions and cheap labor in the import substituting regime. Apparently, in the 
mid-1980s, when developing countries started shifting from import substituting to 
export oriented regimes, they were expected to lose relevance. But, contrary to 
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these expectations SEZs continued to flourish. They even entered into an 
accelerated wave of expansion in the 1990s when the era of globalization set in. 
This period coincided with the rise of Endogenous Growth theories, which 
highlight the role of learning, technology and innovations in promoting economic 
growth. Heterdox economists used the basic premise of these theories to 
explain the rationale of SEZs in a liberal regime. They argue that the developing 
countries that have adopted the model of ‘export oriented regime’ as the lynchpin 
of their developmental strategy heavily rely on FDI for technology transfers 
required for rapid industrialization. However, the numerous production failures 
and bottlenecks that characterize these economies hamper the inflows of FDI. 
The rationale of setting up SEZs is to offer strategic locations with enabling 
investment climate to MNEs for attracting FDI. According to this approach, SEZs 
are enclaves of FDI and their success is not influenced so much by cost 
competitiveness as by enabling business environment which includes besides 
fiscal incentives, good infrastructure, transparent and simplified governance, a 
range of specialized administrative services and good locations (FIAS, 2008; 
Madani, 1999; Yuan and Lorrain, 1992; Sit, 1988). This may therefore be termed 
as the ‘investment–centered approach’. 
 
This approach focuses on the role of SEZs in generating FDI-induced benefits 
on economic development in an export-oriented regime. The argument is that 
the presence of foreign firms generates important spillovers through 
demonstration effects, on-the-job training, learning by doing and copying, and 
contributes to the diffusion of technology and knowledge (Johansson and 
Nilsson, 1997). These spillovers fill gaps in technical, marketing and managerial 
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know-how that the developing countries’ firms face. The heterodox approach 
counters the pessimism of the neo classical and dependency theories. But, a 
general expectation is that FDI attracted to SEZs would automatically generate 
spillovers. This expectation is contentious, is somewhat contradictory to the 
underlying assumption of SEZs being enclaves, and is not supported by 
empirical evidence (Johansson and Nilsson, 1997; Johansson, 1994). 
 
While the heterodox approach is based on export oriented FDI which arises when 
MNCs disintegrate their production processes and locate different processes in 
different countries for offshore processing, according to factor costs and 
capabilities in their pursuit to lower costs of production (UNCTAD 1998, p.11), the 
‘newer- international division of labour’ approach (Aggarwal, 2012a) perceives 
the role of SEZs in promoting offshore outsourcing through contract 
manufacturing, as well. Contract manufacturing is increasingly being used by 
large MNCs as an alternative to operating and maintaining their own offshore 
facility. In this framework, SEZs are instrumental in promoting not only FDI but 
also outward oriented domestic investment. Entry into global chains promises 
domestic firms access to a global pool of new technologies, skills, capital, and 
markets, upgradation of firm-level capabilities from ‘learning’ through technology 
diffusion and exposure to international best practice systems of corporate 
governance. 
 
Overall, the three dominant approaches represent three different contexts in 
which SEZs are created. They offer different rationales, CSFs and development 
outcomes of SEZs underlining the importance of macroeconomic contexts in 
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which SEZs are set up. There is however, no overarching framework that can 
accommodate all these theoretical explanations, and generalize and widen the 
basis for theoretical justification for setting up SEZs, their success factors and 
development outcomes. The existing explanations are in need of generalization. 
They present a narrow and context-specific view of SEZs  
 
Further, while these perspectives differ in their assessment of SEZs, they have a 
common understanding of the basic design and characterstics of SEZs. They are 
grounded in three common premises, which have maneuvered the SEZ debate 
over the past many years. First, SEZs are ‘economic enclaves’ of special policy 
regimes, which are typically set up as attractive geographic spaces segmented 
from the wider economy to attract foreign investors. An economic enclave is a 
physical territory administratively and legally bound, which is set up for a 
particular type of activity. It has weak integration into the local economy and 
therefore its usefulness as a development tool is highly ambiguous (Phelps et al, 
2015). From the perspective of this definition, it is a foregone conclusion that the 
development effects of SEZs on the wider economy are rather limited. But, this is 
inconsistent with the observed phenomenon. SEZs have been the crucial drivers 
of China’s unprecedented and unparalleled economic growth at an incredibly 
accelerated rate. South Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia, Mauritius and Mexico (in the 
initial stages) are other success stories challenging the basic premise of the 
existing approaches. Second, SEZs are transitory; they lose their significance as 
countrywide systemic trade (trade centered approach), and macroeconomic and 
exchange rate reforms (investment centered approach) are implemented. In 
most successful countries, however there has been continuous evolution of SEZs 
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with new forms of zones emerging and the existing ones getting updated. Finally, 
SEZs are the second best solution, the first being the economy wide reforms. But 
there is no justification offered as to why the first best solutions are not adopted 
by policy makers. The concept of ‘first best solutions’ itself needs clarification. 
Policy-making does not occur in a vacuum. Rather, it takes place in culturally and 
historically conditioned complex political and social settings. The policy solutions 
are thus strongly contextual and their ordering as the ‘first or second best’ based 
on other contexts may hurt their implementation and prospects.  
 
The upshot is that the existing theoretical literature needs to evolve. There is a 
need to have a comprehensive framework that can provide guidance to policy 
makers regarding the rationale and usefulness of SEZs. 
 
3. A New Dynamic Institutional Framework of SEZs 
The model presented here draws on the tenets of the ‘dynamics of institutional 
changes’ to answer three key questions: First, what is the rationale of SEZs? 
Two, what are the critical success factors and development outcomes of SEZs? 
Three, what are the evolutionary dynamics of SEZs?  
 
Why SEZs? 
The basic premise of this framework is that institutions are sticky, path 
dependent and complementary. They are deeply intertwined with each other and 
tend to lock in particular institutional arrangements (Boettke et al. 2008). Formal 
institutions, which are under the direct purview of the state can be changed 
rapidly by authoritative orders. But they are both underlined and supplemented 
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by informal institutions (North, 1990) and are locked in the overall institutional 
arrangement with them (Roland, 2004). They are the outcomes of informal 
interactions between different economic, social and political actors pursuing 
conflicting interests (Coleman, 1986; Putnam, 1993; Woolcock and Narayan, 
2000; Helmke and Levitsky, 2004; Williamson 2009), and represent “a 
compromise resulting from the social conflict originating in the heterogeneity of 
interests among agents” (Amable, 2004:10); are politically acceptable; and may 
yield the highest economic returns due to direct synergies (Deeg, 2001; Kang, 
2006). Any attempt to radically transform the formal institutions therefore can 
disturb the institutional equilibrium, creating frictions within society and 
producing unexpected outcomes. But the locked-in institutional arrangement 
may be associated with suboptimal growth outcomes. It may impede the 
effective implementation of the overarching development strategy which itself is 
locked in this arrangement. One way to overcome these impediments and put 
the economy on the path of growth therefore is to create ‘SEZs’ as a safety valve, 
which can absorb the undesirable shock to the lock-in institutional arrangement 
in the wider economy, and can foster the process of investment and growth over 
a shorter period of time.  
 
It means that the relevance of SEZs is strongly context-specific. The setting up 
of SEZs can be justified only if they are designed to effectively target the growth 
impeding institutions in a given context. This requires policy makers to have a 
clear understanding of the country specific macro economic context, the 
development strategy and the role that SEZs can play in it.  
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What are the critical success factors and development outcomes of SEZs? 
There is no one to one relationship between a policy institution and the purposes 
that it can serve. Each policy serves more than one objective, be it budgetary 
policy, monetary policy, labor policy or any other policy for that matter (Chang, 
2011). Budgetary policy for instance can be used to build productive assets (e.g., 
physical infrastructure, R&D facilities), social protection (the welfare state), or 
macroeconomic stability. Similarly, monetary policy can target growth, stability or 
social justice, and so on.  
 
The SEZ policy is no exception. SEZs can be used to achieve a variety of 
economic and economic diplomacy goals. They can thus serve to promote trade 
and FDI, industrial growth and diversification, spatial rejuvenation and 
urbanization, border development, regional integration or international relations. 
But, this does not happen automatically. It requires strategic approach and 
strategic planning around them. The strategic approach outlines what policy 
makers expect to achieve with it and how they plan to achieve that. The former 
specifies the positioning of SEZs within a given development strategy with vision, 
mission, objectives of their establishment; and the latter is the roadmap to 
achieve them. The strategic approach influences the strategic principles 
regarding the SEZ design, location, incentive structure, management processes, 
services to be provided, governance, their linkages with other actors, action plan, 
and so on and so forth. The strategic approach adopted is thus directly related 
with the broader development strategy and institutional impediments to 
implement it.   
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Different strategic approaches are associated with different sets of CSFs, and 
different outcomes. There is no generic list of their success factors and 
outcomes. A country, which clearly identifies the institutional impediments in its 
development process and assigns a well-defined strategic role for SEZs in its 
broader development strategy with a clear understanding of its CSFs, tends to 
perform better than others.  
 
What are the evolutionary dynamics of SEZs? 
Institutions have a two-way relationship with economic development wherein the 
former both influence and are influenced by the latter (Chang, 2006, 2011). As 
SEZ-induced development takes place and domestic conditions change, new 
agents of change emerge in the economy. At the same time, there are shifts in 
power, interests, perceptions and positioning of the existing actors; and there is 
demand for new institutions to adapt to new realities. The changing institutional 
dynamics pose new demands, new goals, and new institutional challenges. In 
line with these dynamics, policy makers must assign new roles to SEZs; and 
continuously upgrade the existing ones and set up the new ones. There are thus 
evolutionary changes in the justification, strategic approaches and designs of 
SEZs, which in turn further impinge on their development outcomes and success 
factors.  
 
The ‘new dynamic institution’ framework of SEZs thus avers that SEZs are like a 
safety valve. They release institutional pressures on growth without giving a 
shock to the lock-in institutional arrangement in the wider economy and foster 
the process of growth. In so far as they can effectively overcome the institutional 
14 
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impediments to growth, they can be set up at any level of development. Further, 
the performance of SEZs crucially depends on the strategic approach towards 
them and its execution. SEZ success stories are few because there is little 
understanding of the rationale of setting up SEZs and the role that they can play 
the in development process. Finally, SEZs must evolve with evolutionary 
changes in the institutional set up in the process of growth; different genres of 
SEZs need to be set up and the existing ones should be upgraded to address 
different challenges and achieve different goals.   
 
4. Assessing the experience of selected Asian countries  
Using the framework discussed above, I assess the experience of 3 most 
successful countries from Asia and draw policy implications for policy makers. 
These countries are: China, South Korea and Taiwan.  
 
China 
Rationale. SEZs in China were launched in 1979 as part of Deng Xiaoping's 
modernization program to turn the country into a relatively advanced 
industrialized nation by the year 2000 with a unique approach of introducing 
successful elements of liberal economic policy into the socialist political regime 
(McKenney, 1993). SEZs were created as a safety valve for opening up the 
economy to foreign investment, allowing labor flexibility, and keeping regulatory 
burden low within the overall framework of authoritarian political regime.  
 
Strategic approach. Unlike other SEZ countries of that time, China adopted an 
ambitious SEZ program, which was motivated by its old treaty ports in design.  
15 
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China set up four SEZs: Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Xiamen and Shantou. These were 
open industrial mega towns spread over several square kms. Shenzhen, for 
instance, spans over nearly 2,000 square km; Shanghai's Pudong district is 522 
square km; and Hainan, 34,000 square km. All of them were located in coastal 
areas. These areas were not merely ideal locations for trade (as is generally 
believed) but were also endowed with cheap land, active participation by officials, 
long tradition of trade and entrepreneurship; and had a greater likelihood of 
attracting non-resident Chinese investment (Lai 2006). China thus aimed at 
creating large clusters of exporting firms (MNEs especially) in the locations 
where investment climate was already conducive for a large-scale activity and 
spin-offs ( Aggarwal, 2011, 2012a). The strategic approach was to create trade 
based agglomerations of internationally competitive MNEs using SEZs, which 
could create a pool of skilled labor; external economies in the form of lower 
costs; increasing returns to scale and knowledge spillovers. It was expected that 
the clusters would further expand by the tendency of spin-offs and suppliers of 
both the clustered industry and related industries to locate near the zone. More 
specifically, China adopted the agglomeration-based industrialization with SEZs 
as the centerpiece. The critical success factors for this strategic approach were 
identified and addressed effectively.  
    
Critical mass of activity. To generate a critical mass of activity, an attractive 
package of good infrastructure, cheap land, cheap labor, fiscal incentives and 
single window clearances was offered to foreign investors in SEZs. Huge money 
was pumped into infrastructure, and lucrative offers were made to skilled labor 
with spacious apartments within the zone. Investment in infrastructure grew from 
16 
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50 million Yuan in 1979 to 2,760 million Yuan in 1985. Wages were lowered to 
raise the profits of foreign enterprises to lure them. Above all, the SEZ 
administration was given powers of provincial government, facilitating approval 
procedures, reducing administrative fees, and enhancing the service function of 
government organs. They can develop their own regulations that can be applied 
in their jurisdiction. They have a Congress.  
 
During the mid-1980s, Shenzhen SEZ began to show signs of economic 
progress with 60 establishments employing 15,000 workers accounting for 69 % 
of the industrial value and 82 % of actual FDI of the city in 1983 (McKenny, 
1993). Inspired by the initial success of Shenzhen, government extended the 
SEZ sector by designating Hainan Province and the new Pudong districts in 
Shanghai as the fifth and Sixth SEZs in 1988 and 1990 respectively.  
 
These six large national SEZs were reinforced by a myriad of smaller zones. As 
early as in 1984, China introduced Economic and Technological Development 
Zones (ETDZs). They are provincial level SEZs with a focus on promoting 
high-tech industries by offering attractive hard and soft investment environment. 
They are set up in and around existing industrial clusters with good industrial 
foundation and convenient communication. To offer single window governance, 
the government awards economic managing right, which is equal to that of the 
local government, to management committee of Economic-Technological 
Development Area also. From 1984 to 1988, 14 ETDZs were established, all in 
the coastal cities. By 2014, the number had increased to 190. Several other 
types of zones followed soon. These include provincial and municipality level 
17 
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SEZs, private SEZs, export processing zones, free trade zones, logistics parks 
and so on. China thus continuously expanded its SEZ sector, as a key element 
of its strategic approach. According to one estimates, by 2007, 300 of 326 
municipalities had 1346 zones (Wang, 2009). 
 
Synergies with local actors. The value of a cluster depends not on the proximity 
of firms but on synergies and networks that they establish with the local economy. 
From the perspective of the literature on clusters, SEZs are satellite clusters 
attracting multinational/ multi-plant firms, which locate their subsidiaries there to 
benefit from government facilities and incentives with little linkages with local 
production systems. China turned these satellite clusters into growth poles by 
adopting a distinct approach of clustering SEZs with each other and with inward 
looking industrial clusters (for instance, High Investment and Industrial zones). 
This was done by promoting clusters of domestic companies in the areas 
surrounding SEZs or by locating different SEZs in the proximity of existing 
clusters or other SEZs or near university areas. The objective was to generate 
synergies between them. The SEZ sector was also expanded vertically by 
locating smaller SEZs such as sector specific SEZs, EPZs and FTZs, within 
larger SEZs to augment them further by creating local value chain within the 
SEZs so that the benefits could flow within the SEZs also. 
 
To incentivize foreign firms to forge linkages with domestic firms, government 
allowed SEZ investors to sell in the domestic markets without paying additional 
duties if they procured 100% raw materials and components from the domestic 
markets or produced high tech products. Besides, until recently, the Chinese 
18 
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authorities made it compulsory for foreign investors to form joint ventures with 
Chinese firms to enter China, in order to obtain exposure to advanced 
technology and new management skills. In return they were offered SEZ 
benefits. These policies paid off.  
 
Successful cluster development strategy. In addition to the above, government 
directly played a catalyst role in the development of SEZ-induced clusters by 
promoting a network of R&D facilities; promoting higher education institutions; 
creating conditions for private entrepreneurship to thrive; and developing good 
infrastructure outside SEZs. 
  
Agglomeration economies generated in the process facilitated further entrants, 
in particular foreign investors. Wang (2009) shows that increasing investment in 
SEZs affects domestic investment also positively in the process. China thus 
succeeded in developing ‘growth poles’ around its large SEZs (Mathews, 2010). 
Two of the most powerful growth poles are: the Pearl River Delta (PRD) in the 
south with Shenzhen at the core and the Yangtze River Delta (YRD) in the east, 
with Shanghai as its principal cosmopolis. According to the official statistics, the 
Yangtze economic zone (with 11 provinces) constituted 46% of the total exports 
of the country in 2014 (GOC, 2015)  
 
The upshot is that China succeeded in transforming its satellite clusters (i.e. 
SEZs) into growth poles with the former at the center. China’s success with 
SEZs remains unparalleled and unprecedented. As of 2007, SEZs (including all 
types of industrial parks and zones) in China accounted for about 22% of 
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national GDP, about 46% of FDI, about 60% of exports, and generated more 
than 30 million jobs (Zhang 2010). However, the role of SEZs in China cannot be 
gauged from the direct effects generated by SEZs. It needs to be assessed from 
the fact that they are at the core of Chinese economic, industrial and political 
prowess. Today China is the largest economy of the World in terms of 
purchasing power parity.   
 
Evolutionary dynamics. Over time, the increasing economic disparities at 
regional level within China have posed new challenges to develop strategies 
with a strong spatial focus. The government is using SEZs as the centerpiece of 
regional development strategy. It set up 77 ETDZs in inner parts of the country 
between 2010 and 2014 and paired them with successful SEZs in the East to 
provide them a wide range of support in their development under the dyadic 
support network program. Kashgar and Horgos development zones in Xinjiang 
province for instance have been paired with Shenzhen SEZ. Since 2010, China 
has set up 135 additional ETDZs across the country with only 58 being in the 
East and 77 are in inner parts of China. Fu and Gao (2007) found a positive 
correlation between the number of provincial Development Zones and GDP per 
capita concluding that the provincial development zones are also engines of the 
regional economy of China.   
 
Evidence suggests that SEZs have also moved up the value chains. In 1991, 
only 2.8 % of the Shenzhen’s manufactured exports were high-tech. By 2004 
they amounted to $30.6 billion and accounted for 51.2 % of the manufactured 
exports (Li, 2006). By 2007, in all large SEZs taken together, over 40 % of the 
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total industrial output was from high tech industries (Zheng, 2012). The ETDZs 
also accounted for one third of total high tech exports. Shenzhen remains the 
largest SEZ, which accounted for over 77 % of the total exports of 218 billion 
produced by 5 city- SEZs. It was transformed first from a fishing town to become 
the epicenter of China’s manufacturing miracle, and now it is reinventing itself as 
an innovation city, a new frontier for technology. To encourage high tech activity, 
SEZs still maintain attractive tax preferences for high-tech enterprises, and 
provide highly efficient and specialized 24 hours services to investors along with 
world-class soft and hard infrastructure in all types of SEZs. Fu and Gao (2007) 
have shown that the ETDZs have been playing an important role in human 
capital formation, as well. They have been incurring large expenditures to 
support education and training.  In 2005, the ETDZs used 6.69 % of all their 
expenditure to support related education and training; this was 4.24 billion Yuan 
per year.  
  
Finally, China’s SEZs have also evolved from being a tool of economic policy to 
that of economic diplomacy. In the 1990s, China initiated the development of 
Border Economic Zones in cooperation with Myanmar, Vietnam and Lao and 
mooted the idea of cross border zones to promote regional integration and 
exploit the cheap cost advantage through integration, overcoming the border 
area based institutional impediments. In the mid 2000s, the government adopted 
a policy of ‘going out’ to encourage Chinese companies to promote the 
establishment of overseas industrial and trade zones. According to a press 
release of the Ministry of Commerce (January 18, 2016), up to the end of 
December 2015, 75 cooperation zones were being promoted by Chinese 
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enterprises, half of which were the processing and manufacturing zones with a 
total investment of US$ 7.05 billion and 1,209 enterprises operating in them. The 
total value of output of the cooperation zones were US$ 42.09 billion with the tax 
of US$ 1.42 billion paid to the host countries. They are expected to not only help 
increase demand for Chinese-made machinery and equipment and reduce costs, 
but also assist China’s efforts to boost industrial restructuring at home and 
nurture companies to move up the value chain.  
 
South Korea 
Rationale South Korea launched a state driven highly ambitious industrialization 
program in 1962. In the initial phase of growth, the government adopted a 
two-pronged strategy of industrialization. It followed rigorous export-oriented 
policies in mature industries where it already had developed comparative 
advantage (food and textiles, in the 1960s, and metal, shipbuilding and 
chemicals, in the 1970s) and an import-substituting strategy in heavy consumer 
goods industries (fertilizers, cements, steel, machinery and oil refinery). 
Chaebols, the large conglomerates were assigned the key role in the 
development of both export and import substituting industries. Highly restrictive 
policies were adopted towards FDI to shield these firms from foreign competition. 
FDI was encouraged only in export-oriented sectors to promote exports of the 
manufacturing goods. Since the country’s own technological capabilities were 
limited, the government encouraged the transfer of foreign technology embodied 
in capital goods and turnkey plants.   
 
The policy led to massive imports of foreign capital goods. This raised the 
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problem of foreign exchange reserves drain. It was against this backdrop that 
the government planned to build its first free export zone (FEZ) in 1970, in 
Masan, with the objective of encouraging FDI in export-oriented sectors to 
facilitate technology transfers, promote competitiveness of the manufacturing 
sector, generate employment, and release pressure on foreign exchange 
reserves to support its dual policy of industrialization (Ying 1995, Lee 2008).  It 
allowed only foreign firms to operate in ‘free export zones’ (FEZs). By 1972, 26 
foreign companies had moved into the zone. In 1973, Iksan FEZ was also 
constructed on Korea’s west coast.  
 
Strategic approach. Korea introduced FEZs as ‘enclaves’ to address the 
impediments posed by its restrictive FDI regime in the manufacturing sector and 
generate both investment (FDI and technology transfers) and trade related 
( employment and foreign exchange) benefits. In the initial phases, FEZs served 
as safety valves for its development strategy and became instrumental in 
promoting employment, foreign exchange and FDI inflows to support its 
industrialization process (Aggawal 2012b). Over the next few years, the country 
grew miraculously fast to achieve the GNI per capita of US$1,000 in 1977 from a 
mere US$291 in 1971, with exports reaching US$10 billion. As growth 
progressed, economic restructuring became inevitable. In the 1970s, Korea 
initiated the process of transforming its industrial structure with a focus on heavy 
and chemical industries. This required technological upgrading of domestic 
producers in newer sectors. The government recognized the role of FEZs in 
technology transfers to the domestic mainland to strengthen the 
competitiveness of the manufacturing sector. For this, first it lowered the 
23 
Asia Research Centre, CBS, Copenhagen Discussion Papers [2017-64] 
 
transaction barriers between FEZ and non-FEZ firms. In the late 1970s, the law 
was amended to allow outsourcing of production processes outside the zones. 
Second, for catalyzing the process, Korean firms were also allowed to invest in 
these zones in the 1980s. Third, the government run industrialization program 
ensured that domestic capabilities in production and technological development 
were promoted through well-targeted industrial and R&D policies (Aggarwal, 
2001).  
 
In 1987, when labor struggles (Maruyama and Yokota, 2008) led to increased 
wages and the government took to restructuring the economic activity in favor of 
capital intensive industries, FEZs were also restructured to focus only on capital 
and technology intensive products so as to attract more sophisticated 
technologies thorough FDI (Ying, 1995: Ch. 5). The direct role of FEZs in 
employment creation and exports declined, but many SEZ companies started 
outsourcing their labor-intensive processes to non-FEZ firms. In 1988, 56 out of 
the 73 zone firms had engaged 525 domestic firms for outsourcing processes 
(Madani, 1999). This permitted increased employment and exports as well as 
spillover of technology in the wider economy. Post 1987, SEZs were however 
marginalized in the growth process of Korea, which was essentially driven by 
large conglomerates.  
 
Evolutionary dynamics: Post 1997. In the aftermath of the East Asian crisis in 
the late 1990s, Korea committed itself to restructure, reform and rebuild the 
economy and put it back on a high growth trajectory. It adopted advancement in 
industrial structure, enhancement of competitiveness, and the promotion of new 
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industry creation as the major pillars of the strategy. The policy of prioritizing 
manufacturing industries was shelved. The Industrial development Act 1999 
contained a provision to target both manufacturing and non-manufacturing 
industries. With a change in the development strategy, the country focused on 
SEZs to overcome the restrictions imposed on FDI in the service sector and 
other growth restrictive institutions. In the late 1990s, it targeted the 
development of the logistics industry to position itself as a logistic hub in the 
region. But relatively higher rates and complex tariff system, which involved a 
multiplicity of rates were seen as the major impediments in promoting 
transshipment trade. To address this impediment, Korea upgraded its 
manufacturing zones with logistics facilities (Aggarwal, 2012b) to well equip 
them with the necessary software and hardware to augment them to serve as 
the logistics-oriented free trade zones as well 2 . In 2000, it initiated new 
logistics-oriented free trade zones. Under this policy, 6 logistics-oriented zones 
are currently operational. Between 2008 and 2010, the FTZs (of both 
manufacturing and logistics variety) generated US$ 8.3 billion of imports and 
US$14.6 billion of exports; with 13,676 persons employed in the firms in these 
FTZs (WTO, 2012). Inspired by the success of its policy, government introduced 
foreign investment zones also with attractive incentive packages.  
 
In 2002, the Korean strategy of economic restructuring and balanced regional 
development placed SEZs as the center, when it initiated ‘free economic zones’ 
(FEZs) program as part of its efforts to attract foreign investment, particularly in 
2 The term free export zones was dropped in favor of free trade zones. FEZs came to be called ‘ 
manufacturing oriented FTZs’ and were distinguished from the ‘logistics-oriented FTZs’. 
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services, and ultra high tech and R&D sectors to transform itself into a 
knowledge economy, serve as the financial, logistics and business hub of 
Northeast Asia and achieve balanced regional development. The FEZs offer not 
only a highly relaxed FDI regime in services but also carry attractive incentive 
packages for them. They are regarded as the main axis of the FDI policy (Lee, 
2008, Jeong, 2008). FEZs are conceptualized as world-class cities and are 
equipped with cutting-edge infrastructure and services, and mark a major shift in 
the strategic approach towards SEZs, which were until then used as a 
supporting tool to plug in gaps in the development strategy. FEZs are based on 
the agglomeration approach with a focus on scale and competitiveness and are 
at the center of the ambitious goals of its development strategy.  As of 
end-2015, there were 98 FIZs, 13 FTZs and 8 FEZs in South Korea. Total FDI in 
these zones, where 682 companies employing 149,000 persons operated, 
amounted to US$14 billion (WTO, 2016)3. These zones also appear to have 
made a significant contribution to the resilience of the Korean economy to crises 
by providing significant foreign exchange reserves and broad-basing its 
economy. In 1997, South Korea was one of the worst hit countries by the crisis, 
and its IMF-led emergency bailout program cost around US$60bn.  The 2008 
shock was much milder with no IMF bailout, and GDP turned to positive growth 
in the first quarter of 2009 itself (Sakong and Koh, 2010).  
 
Taiwan  
Rationale. Taiwan introduced its first four-year plan in 1952 with an objective of 
3 The Official website of FEZs however indicates the presence of 2235 companies with FDI of $10 billion 
in FEZs alone.  
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promoting labor- intensive manufactured products under import substituting 
regime. These industries developed quite fast and by 1956, the domestic market 
was almost saturated. The government therefore sought to encourage exports 
(Ying, 1995). In 1966, the first export-processing zone (EPZ) was set up in 
Kaohsiung (KEPZ) as part of the government policy of expanding exports of the 
labor-intensive products in the import-substituting regime (EDEPZ, 1987; as 
quoted in Ying, 1995) and generating trade related benefits. A highly attractive 
incentive package was offered to EPZs to attract investment both from domestic 
and foreign investors. Soon, there was pressure to expand the area and two 
more zones emerged, one in Nantze, just outside of Kaohsiung; and another 
smaller zone near Taichung. These EPZs became instrumental in attracting FDI. 
By 1990, 88 enterprises existed in Kaohsiung EPZ with a total investment of $ 
170.38 million. Of this, foreign investment accounted for $140 million (82%); only 
18% was local investment (as informed in Aggarwal 2012b). 
  
Strategic approach: SMEs have been the main vehicle of Taiwan’s 
industrialization strategy. Taiwan recognized the role of EPZs in providing 
platform for small firms to get inserted into global value chains through 
subcontracting and upgrade themselves technologically, at an early stage of its 
development. Government adopted both reactive and proactive policy 
approaches to encourage subcontracting between the EPZ and non-EPZ firms. 
As part of its reactive policy, it lowered transaction barriers between the two; and 
using a proactive approach, government supported them to help build their 
productive capacities to participate in these transactions. The state played a 
crucial role in targeting industries and strengthening production capabilities of 
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domestic firms through the use of targeted credit, subsidies, incentives 
packages, and import protection to expand output, productivity, export 
competitiveness, and economic growth (Amsden, 1989; Evans, 1995; Wade, 
1990). Integration with the global value chains strengthened the technological 
competitiveness of SMEs by giving them access to a global pool of new 
technologies, skills, capital, and markets. As a consequence, they could target 
more sophisticated market segments such as design, marketing and branding 
and move up the value chains. According to Wang (1990), 1000 Taiwanese firms 
were subcontracted by EPZ firms to the tune of US $392 million in 1988. Of them 
250 domestic firms carried out partial processing. Over time they moved up from 
being second tier to first tier subcontractors; from low to high value added 
activities; and finally, from ‘original equipment manufacturers’ to ‘original brand 
manufacturers’. This approach is akin to the vertically specialized 
industrialization (VSI) approach proposed by Milberg et al (2014).  
 
Evolutionary dynamics. Industrial structure in Taiwan underwent several 
transformations during the process of development; EPZs were also upgraded 
along with that. Initially they were dominated by labor-intensive industries. These 
industries were sloughed off in the 1970s to upgrade EPZs by attracting 
capital-intensive industries. In the 1980s, the focus was directed to high tech 
industries. Restructuring was achieved by a careful maneuvering of fiscal 
incentive schemes specified in the ‘Statute for the Encouragement of Investment 
(SEI). The ‘Statute’ was amended five times during this period to steer EPZs 
towards changing economic roles. The share of electronics and precision 
instruments increased from 58 % in 1975 to 67 % by 1990.  
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The availability of domestic capabilities made it possible for zone enterprises to 
establish linkages with domestic producers and further augment their 
capabilities. Over time, a two-way relationship has developed between EPZ and 
non-EPZ firms. EPZ investors have become important customers for Taiwanese 
companies outside the zones. In 2015, domestic inputs shipped into the 
Kaohsiung zone equaled 48% of the zones’ total export value (Crook, 2016). 
 
In the late 1990s, against the backdrop of the East Asian crisis (1997-99), the 
government committed itself to the development of the logistics industry and 
decided to use EPZs as the vehicle to promote the industry (Aggarwal, 2012b for 
reference). Under the policy, in 2001, the Warehouse Trans-Shipment Special 
Zone Plan was launched with emphasis on logistic firms. Under the plan, all 
export-processing zones were designated as customs bonded zones and were 
equipped with logistics facilities to drive the growth of the industry. In 2003, the 
government enacted the ‘Act for the Establishment and Management of 
Free-trade Ports’ aiming at promoting the development of global logistics and 
management systems; making possible vigorous promotion of trade liberalization 
and internationalization; facilitating the smooth flow of personnel, goods, funds, 
and technology; and upgrading Taiwan’s national competitiveness. Since then 
six Free Trade zones have been set up.  
 
There has been continuous growth in the EPZ sector albeit weakly, despite the 
fact that the administrative regime is simplified in the wider economy as well. 
They still enjoy immunity from institutional rigidities in the labor market and FDI 
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regime. Taiwan has currently ten export processing zones (EPZs) and 6 free 
trade zones. These zones are clustered together to form two growth poles, one 
each in Kaohsiung and Taichung Cities, which are reinforced by science parks 
and industrial parks of various types. Thus the strategic positioning of small EPZs 
close to each other has generated a mutually supporting whole with benefits 
flowing forward, backward, vertically and horizontally; international technology 
inflows and foreign competition act as the driving force of their dynamism. 
 
The upshot is that all three countries introduced zones as a safety valve to 
overcome institutional impediments to growth in the wider economy to foster 
growth. Given their socio-economic and political compulsions, this was viewed 
as the best policy option. SEZs allowed the governments to practice liberal trade 
policy (as in Taiwan), a relaxed FDI regime (as in S.Korea), and capitalist 
policies (as in China). All three of them offered a highly lucrative and 
comprehensive package of incentives to investors with a comprehensive 
administrative and institutional framework, fiscal incentives, and relaxed labor 
conditions to attract FDI and generate trade and investment related benefits in 
their respective countries. But they did not view trade and investment as the 
ultimate outcomes of their SEZ endeavors. All three adopted a development 
oriented evolutionary approach towards them. There were strong parallels in 
their development strategies with developmental state, focus on manufacturing, 
and prioritization of industries being the major pillars of the policy. Yet, there 
were differences in the approaches towards the process of development, which 
could be attributed to differences in their macro-economic contexts. Therefore, 
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each adopted a distinct strategic approach towards its SEZs to drive its 
development goals.  
 
Korea adopted a dual policy regime and its strategic focus was on the 
development of light industry based export-led growth to ensure foreign 
exchange inflows to support its heavy industrialization program and generate 
employment. It used its SEZs initially as enclaves of trade and FDI to meet these 
development goals and focused on mere attracting FDI. Gradually, it introduced 
reforms in the law and lowered transaction barriers between SEZs and the wider 
economy. It upgraded its FEZs in line with the industrial restructuring in the wider 
economy to facilitate linkages between the FEZ and non-FEZ firms. However, 
since the development strategy focused on large conglomerates as drivers of 
growth, FEZs essentially remained enclaves of low value added activities. Their 
role declined sharply in the late 1980s (as enclaves) with rapid growth taking 
place outside them. But, the 1997 crisis revealed longstanding structural 
weaknesses in Korea's development model. After this crisis, Korea started to 
build a knowledge economy with balanced regional development and steered its 
SEZ policy to overcome the institutional impediments besetting the economy 
and achieve its development goals. While the SEZ policy was used to plug in the 
gaps in the development strategy in the initial phases, in the post 1997 period, it 
occupies the center stage with FEZs becoming the axis of its FDI policy. The role 
of its traditional EPZs has however declined sharply. 
     
Taiwan followed a relatively less aggressive industrialization plans. It progressed 
slowly from light to capital to knowledge intensive industries with essentially small 
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and medium enterprises driving the economy. Taiwan used EPZs as the platform 
for strengthening the small and medium enterprises by integrating them with 
GVCs. This approach was a variant of the vertically specialized industrialization 
strategy proposed by Milberg et al (2014). Once integrated with GVCs, 
enterprises moved from the assembly of imported inputs to increased local 
production and sourcing (OEMs) and then finally to the sale of their own branded 
merchandise (OBMs) targeting more sophisticated market segments such as 
design, marketing and branding both in and outside of SEZs. They developed a 
mutually reinforcing relationship with EPZs with each augmenting the other. 
Taiwan has expanded its SEZ sector in the post 1997 period to address the 
regulatory constraints that had affected its competitiveness. However, over time 
the zones’ contribution as a proportion of the island’s exports has declined to 
around 4.7% in 2014. But, it has maneuvered its location policy such that it has 
created two growth poles at Kaohsiung and Taichung cities to generate 
agglomeration economies with science and industrial parks in vicinity. 
 
China traversed a trajectory which is distinctly different from that followed by 
Taiwan and Korea. It viewed SEZs as the key element of its cluster-based 
industrialization strategy. The institutional structure of SEZs, which provided 
considerable economic incentives and leeway to local authorities; large city-size; 
and open-ness facilitated domestic linkages with SEZs in the initial stages itself. 
Subsequently, smaller zones were created in the proximity of the existing zones 
or near industrially developed locations or clusters to generate synergies 
between them and promote a critical size of economic activity. At the same time 
synergies were created with the regional economies using appropriate policy 
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packages, reaping the benefits of increasing returns, external economies and 
complementarities. Agglomeration economies generated in the process has 
accelerated the growth of these zones and has immensely benefitted the 
economy as a whole. While Korea and Taiwan identified the role of SEZs in their 
development strategy and were benefitted by them in the effective 
implementation of their respective development strategy, China’s growth 
strategy itself place them at the center (in addition to state owned enterprises) 
and the growth process was largely driven by them. 
 
5. Policy Implications 
The major policy implications are threefold. First, SEZs are a safety valve that 
can address institutional inefficiencies by overcoming growth constraining 
institutions within a given locked-in institutional arrangement. Policy markers 
implementing the SEZ policy must have a clear understanding of the 
macroeconomic context, development challenges, and the role that SEZs can 
play in a given context. Second, if used strategically, the SEZ policy can be an 
exceedingly versatile tool to achieve a variety of goals. Crucial to a successful 
SEZ policy is selecting a strategic approach to produce the desired outcomes. 
This requires a clear understanding of the goals to be achieved and the 
mechanisms that underpin the links between SEZs and these goals. The drivers 
of success and economic outcomes of SEZs depend on the strategic approach 
adopted by policy makers towards SEZs. There is no single recipe of their 
success or development outcomes. An enclave SEZ, which is not designed for 
development cannot be expected to yield development benefits by policy makers. 
Thus, it is the SEZ policy and not SEZs per se that need to be evaluated. Finally, 
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institutions evolve in the process of development. So must strategic approaches 
towards SEZs. New genres of SEZs need to emerge and the existing ones must 
upgrade to address new institutional challenges, and achieve new goals. This 
evolution is key for a successful SEZ strategy.  
 
A serious risk with SEZs as development tools arises when they remain 
‘enclaves’ of trade and FDI with little linkages with the wider economy. This can 
delay the process of industrialization in an economy by diverting resources and 
the attention of policy makers away from building industrial capabilities within the 
wider economy. A well-endowed enclave SEZ can be instrumental in attracting 
FDI and promoting trade but it starts losing relevance as the macro contexts 
change. Any effort to sustain cost advantages of SEZs at the low end of activities 
over time is not sustainable and can harm the process of industrialization in the 
wider economy. The experience of the selected Asian countries presented here 
indicates that a strong focus on the development goals, sound understanding of 
the role that SEZs can play in given institutional context and continuous 
evaluation and evolution of the policy have been the major pre-requisites to 
achieve phenomenal outcomes using SEZs.  
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